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Article 2

Science, Intersubjective Validity,
and Judicial Legitimacy
Richard B. Katskee†
The problems associated with discovering truth in the
courtroom are well known. Eyewitness testimony is notoriously
unreliable. Statistics are almost endlessly manipulable. Paid
experts slant their findings or, less disreputably, perhaps, but
equally effectively, adjust the questions that they ask in order
to yield findings supporting the party who hired them. But in
litigating challenges to the incorporation of religious beliefs
packaged as science into public-school curricula,1 my concern
with the relationship between expert testimony and scientific
truth has less to do with the mechanics of weighing possibly
conflicting expert opinions than with the deference so often
afforded to those who don the trappings of science, whether
they engage in bona fide scientific research or merely peddle
nonscientific truth-claims masquerading as science.
Although much of this symposium has focused, in one
way or another, on whether science offers a window on the
truth commensurate with the pride of place that scientific
evidence receives in legal factfinding, that question may be
too narrow to acknowledge the full value of scientific evidence
in judicial proceedings. If scientific research offers access to
truth that other forms of evidence do not, affording it extra
deference makes perfect sense. But whether ultimate or objective truth even exists, and, if so, whether we as humans have
epistemic access to it (through scientific inquiry or otherwise),
are metaphysical puzzles that have plagued philosophers and
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Assistant Legal Director, Americans United for Separation of Church and

State.
1
The author was one of the principal attorneys for the plaintiffs in the 2005
case successfully challenging the inclusion of intelligent-design creationism in the
biology curriculum at a public high school in Dover, Pennsylvania. See Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). The author has since
served as lead counsel in other cases involving the teaching of intelligent design,
creation science, and other religiously based attacks on the scientific theory of
evolution.
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theologians since at least Plato’s day; and it is not clear that we
are any closer to solving them than the Ancient Greeks were.
Courts must, of course, set aside those thorny issues in
performing their daily tasks, acting instead as though ultimate
truth exists and is reasonably accessible to anyone who in good
faith looks for it. Otherwise, metaphysical and epistemological
anxieties would overwhelm courts’ ability ever to provide
definitive judgments. But the need for courts to act as though
they can discover ultimate truth through ordinary legal
proceedings does not resolve the deeper questions. Nor,
therefore, does it justify viewing science in the courtroom as
useful for getting to the truth of the matter being adjudicated.
Irrespective of the metaphysical status of ultimate
truth, or of science’s relation to it, a better question may be
whether anything about the nature of science (whether or not it
relates to the capacity to reveal truth) warrants setting
scientific evidence above other categories of truth-claims as a
grounding for legal judgments. As background for considering
that question, Part I provides a more detailed statement of the
concern about courts’ institutional competence to deal with
scientific evidence, and Part II describes courts’ institutional
aims and the value of publicly justified judicial rulings for
achieving those aims. Part III explains why science as a
discipline has special power to promote shared understanding.
And Part IV seeks to defend the respect that courts show to
scientific evidence in light of the public confidence in the legal
system that follows from judgments’ being rooted in shared
understandings of the sort that science provides.
The point is, in the end, a simple one: Scientific evidence
has special value in legal proceedings because science confers
intersubjective validity that other categories of truth-claims
often lack. It offers factfinders and concerned observers a
common yardstick against which to measure the validity and
explanatory power of proffered evidence. So opinions grounded
in science carry their own tests for reliability and usefulness,
thus inspiring special confidence in judgments based on them.
And by fostering greater public trust in legal rulings,
judgments premised on scientific evidence reinforce the legal
system’s ability to resolve disputes that might otherwise
threaten a peaceful, well-ordered society.
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THE INSTITUTIONAL-COMPETENCE PROBLEM

In defending, at least in general (if not necessarily in
specific cases), the role that science plays in legal proceedings, I
am not deaf to the frequently voiced complaint that juries and
judges are ill suited to the task of evaluating competing
scientific claims. The complaint is one about institutional
competence: Factfinders are not trained as scientists, so they
are unlikely to possess the substantive knowledge and
analytical skills required to parse scientific claims; and far
from making up for those deficiencies, the adversary system
compounds the problem by driving parties to present skewed
accounts and to gloss over weaknesses and inconsistencies in
the methodologies employed, the data collected, and the
conclusions drawn by experts testifying on their behalf.
But while institutional-competence concerns are certainly
important, complaints about courts’ inability to understand
science are not terribly informative when divorced from
consideration of institutional objectives. And when courts’
institutional purpose and social role are taken into account,
criticisms of factfinders’ supposedly dismal performance in
evaluating scientific evidence may be overblown.
Consider a run-of-the-mine tort case in which the
factfinder (whether judge or jury) must decide which party is
providing the best account of how some injury occurred.
Irrespective of what that injury is, or what the legal claims are,
or what proof each party offers, it is natural to wonder whether
the factfinder will have knowledge and experience of the
relevant sorts, and in sufficient measure, to weigh the
evidence, evaluate the competing arguments, and come to the
correct conclusion—in other words, to figure out the truth of
the matter. And when apparently conflicting scientific evidence
is a trial’s centerpiece, the anxiety deepens: If we doubt judges’
and juries’ ability to evaluate witnesses’ credibility, for
example, even though everyone enters the courtroom with at
least some independent experience distinguishing truthfulness
from deceit, must we not be even more skeptical of factfinders’
capacity to weigh competing scientific claims, when so few
among us possess even rudimentary training in that
enterprise? After all, most judges and jurors are unlikely to
have ever before tried to make sense of the sorts of data being
put before them in a trial; they may be swayed by flash rather
than substance; and even when they would otherwise possess
sufficient acumen to separate scientific wheat from junk-
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science chaff, their efforts may be stymied by the parties’
attempts to sweep under the rug the limitations of an expert
witness’s research program and the qualifiers that would
inevitably accompany the findings if they were presented in
even the most slipshod research paper.
But if factfinders’ evaluation of expert testimony is good
enough to allow courts to fulfill their designated social role,
then courts are sufficiently competent as factfinders to consider
the evidence for purposes of deciding cases. And judicial
decisions will be acceptably reliable, even if judges’ and juries’
evaluations of competing scientific claims might sometimes be
unsophisticated enough to bring tears to the eyes of any highschool biology or physics teacher—much less to a qualified
researcher working in the relevant field of study. So
determining institutional competence to evaluate scientific
evidence requires looking, in the first instance, not at
factfinders’ scientific acumen, but at courts’ designated social
role.
II.

LEGAL JUDGMENTS AND INTERSUBJECTIVE VALIDITY

As John Locke explained, law courts are a prerequisite
to social stability: Impartial judges empowered to make
definitive legal rulings provide a mechanism for disputants to
resolve their disagreements without having to resort to
physical violence or other self-help remedies.2 We set up judges
and courts as higher authorities with the power to declare who
wins and who loses, who receives compensation and who pays,
who exacts retribution and who suffers punishment, not
because we think that they will always get things exactly right,
but just because deferring to a neutral arbiter helps ensure
that we don’t end up in blood feuds to resolve every petty
grievance. But a legal system prevents interpersonal violence
and quells broader social strife only if both the parties to
particular controversies and the public in general are in the
end willing to accept and obey legal judgments. For if not,
invoking the judicial process might delay, but will not prevent,
resorts to bloodshed. It thus turns out that disputes over how
to assess the reliability of various categories of evidence or how
to deal with factfinders’ possibly inept weighing of truth-claims
implicate deeper issues of political legitimacy: If a court is to
2

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 13, 19-20 (1690).
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resolve disputes definitively and finally, and hence to justify
invoking political authority to enforce its orders, it must
persuade those subject to its rulings to trust it to decide who
should bear the costs of an accident or who should receive
punishment for a crime—in other words, to make conclusive
determinations regarding litigants’ fates.
In light of that socially important, but in a metaphysical
sense fairly modest, institutional aim, courts need not be
infallible expositors of truth. In most cases, it is enough that a
court comes to some decision—any decision—that the parties
will accept as dispositive. For courts don’t just attempt to
ascertain truth; they define it. Justice Jackson’s famous
aphorism, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final,”3 provides a pointed
reminder that a judicial ruling makes true as a legal matter
the findings that it encompasses, irrespective of whether the
judge, jury, or appellate tribunal got everything exactly right.
Judicial fiat is not, of course, a terribly satisfying basis for
dispute resolution; and hence, it alone is not a secure
grounding for a legal system. But if the parties and the public
have the considered conviction that courts do a pretty good job
finding facts, deciding cases, and resolving disagreements most
of the time—in other words, that the legal system on the whole
serves us better than trying to settle the score ourselves
whenever we feel wronged—then we will generally be willing to
let the courts act as final arbiter. And we will usually accept
even unfavorable judgments from them.
Thus, what matters for a legal system’s legitimacy is, in
the first instance, that losers in legal actions believe that the
treatment they received from the courts was at least minimally
fair and respectful of them as the prevailing parties’ political
equals. A losing party must be able to see that the court has
listened to its arguments, weighed all the relevant evidence,
and explained the ruling in a way that the party can recognize
as a valid—albeit unfavorable and perhaps imperfect—exercise
of judicial authority. As I have suggested elsewhere,4 the losers’
view matters most because winners do not need to have their
victories justified to them. Unless a prevailing party expects to
be a repeat player in litigation, fighting the same battle against
future opponents in other cases, it is unlikely to care why it
3

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Richard B. Katskee, Why It Mattered to Dover that Intelligent Design Isn’t
Science, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 112, 153-54 (2006).
4
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won: Knowing that it won is quite satisfying enough. But to the
unsuccessful litigant, quite a lot depends on believing that the
arbitrator was impartial, that the hearing was fair, and that
the final decision fell within at least a broad range of outcomes
warranted by the evidence when evaluated using permissible
forms of analysis. A litigant’s views about a judgment on those
dimensions may make the difference between accepting an
unfavorable ruling and keeping the fight going outside the
courts.
Stepping back from the parties’ views of any single case
to an aggregate social perspective, the procedures that a legal
system employs and the judgments that it produces, when
taken all together, have to be fair enough, both on average and
in the most significant cases, to encourage members of the
society to keep reverting to the courts as the principal
mechanism for resolving disputes. Courts’ legitimacy depends,
in other words, not just on individual losing parties’ walking
away with the conviction that a courtroom was the proper
venue to resolve grievances (however upset the parties might
have been about the final verdict), but on the public’s having
faith that the legal process will afford a fair hearing and
generally fair treatment to those who invoke it—and that the
courts will give careful, respectful consideration even to
nonparties’ interests when they are implicated in lawsuits.
If courts are to provide what most of us will regard as a
fair trial in those senses, and hence to instill confidence that
the legal system is the right place to turn to resolve
disagreements, they must base their rulings on publicly
accessible facts, which they must then weigh, measure, and
test using publicly accessible forms of legal reasoning. In other
words, courts have to limit themselves to types of evidence and
modes of analysis that are equally intelligible to everyone, at
least in principle, and to employ relatively transparent
procedures, so that the resulting judgments are defensible as
something more than mere caprice. If a court can explain its
reasons for reaching some conclusion, and those reasons are
generally accepted as valid—that is to say, commonly
recognized as appropriate to a judicial decision-maker given
the applicable legal rules, and taking into account the relative
seriousness of the case—the accuracy or truth of the judgment
in a metaphysical sense may be rather beside the point. For if a
court relies on commonly shared premises and modes of
reasoning that litigants and the public as a whole can recognize
as suitable, and if it uses those analytical tools to draw what
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the parties and the public can regard as reasonable inferences
from facts that are themselves intelligible to, and in some sense
verifiable by, everyone, then the resulting judgment will have
intersubjective validity—in other words, the basis for shared
understanding of its fitness. And if a judgment is grounded in
that sort of shared understanding, it cannot be written off as
an exercise of raw power; it must be regarded, even by those
who dislike the result, as deserving of respect, and ultimately,
of obedience.
To be sure, the higher the stakes are, or the more in the
public eye the controversy is, the more accuracy that both
litigants and the public as a whole will demand. If a limb from
my neighbor’s tree falls onto my fence, we might disagree
heatedly about which of us should bear the cost of the repairs
and in what amount. But it does not matter very much for
practical purposes whether a court hearing the dispute orders
my neighbor to pay me enough to build a new, stronger fence;
or awards just enough to enable me to patch the broken boards;
or denies my claim altogether. Pretty much any definitive
answer will do: As long as there is some mechanism to assign
fault and assess compensation, I will not need to try to break
even by stealing my neighbor’s lawnmower—or to get even by
poisoning his azaleas. But if, for example, the question is
whether my physician should compensate me for a lifetime’s
lost wages because of a misdiagnosis, and whether she should
in the process suffer a substantial blemish on her professional
record, the stakes are higher; so a judgment bearing greater
indicia of reliability is warranted. And when the stakes are at
their highest—as when the question is whether a court should
impose a severe criminal penalty or announce a new legal rule
that would affect large numbers of people—the parties and the
public reasonably demand a judgment with the highest degree
of accuracy possible. The systematic failure to live up to that
heightened expectation, especially in well-publicized cases,
would substantially erode public confidence in the legal system
as the appropriate means to resolve disputes, thus encouraging
people to forsake the courts entirely and fall back on self-help
remedies. If the most significant controversies are seen not to
be amenable to resolution through the legal system, in other
words, the fact that the courts handle mundane grievances
tolerably well is hardly a source of long-term social stability.
But to say that we expect greater accuracy or certainty
in the cases where the stakes are high is nothing more (and
nothing less) than to acknowledge that we demand more robust
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public justifications for courts’ decisions. Definitiveness alone
is insufficient: We insist on exceptionally clear, detailed
explanations for the rulings—explanations grounded in facts
and legal principles that are both widely intelligible and
generally accepted as reasonable.
In demanding more careful, complete justifications in
important cases, we also shrink, to some extent, the pool of
potential judgments that might be considered legally
warranted. For in the first instance, the losing party when the
stakes are extraordinarily high will likely be unwilling to
accept an adverse judgment absent strong reasons to think
that the court (a) considered all the relevant evidence and
arguments with particular thoroughness and care; (b) applied
only proper forms of legal reasoning; and (c) drew inferences
and reached conclusions that are intelligible, reasonable, and
suited to the seriousness of the case. The more conscientious
the court has been in rendering its decision, however, the more
limited the set of possible outcomes will be. Whereas in a minor
dispute, a judgment might be perfectly good if it does nothing
more than give the parties bare direction in how to act toward
one another so that they can get on with their business—
and hence virtually any decision will do (so long as it can
practicably be implemented)—in important cases, the greater
need for publicly justified rulings means that only more
rigorous and more rigorously fair decision-making will pass
muster, with the result that more possible outcomes will be
rejected as illogical, irreconcilable with the evidence, fundamentally unfair, or otherwise legally untenable.
In the end, most of us will only rarely be aware of
mundane legal disputes that do not involve us; we need only
believe that, at the most general level, the courts provide a
reasonably efficient mechanism to resolve those everyday
controversies. But when a case’s outcome will affect large
numbers of people (as in toxic-tort suits or suits involving
corporate malfeasance injuring employees, shareholders, and
customers alike), or when it implicates our most basic notions
of liberty (as in criminal prosecutions where the accused faces
severe penalties) or equality (as in civil-rights actions challenging official discrimination), we demand that the courts
provide especially strong public justifications for their rulings.
For what confers legitimacy on a legal system (thus making
peaceable resort to the courts the accepted means to resolve the
disputes that would otherwise have the greatest potential
to create social divisions and civil unrest) is the ability of
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everyone, at least in principle, to understand important judicial
decisions and to regard them as worthy of respect. To be sure,
intersubjective validity of that sort may not be easy to achieve,
especially in the most important, most public, and most
difficult cases—which are, of course, the ones where it is
most needed. But ensuring intersubjective validity is far more
modest an institutional aim than discovering ultimate truth.
So the criticism that courts are not infallible expositors of that
truth—that they sometimes get things wrong—need not be
viewed as a fatal blow to a legal system’s legitimacy.
III.

METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND INTERSUBJECTIVE
VALIDITY

Just as judicial opinions become more persuasive the
more that judges take care to apply rules and invoke principles
that are intelligible to and generally accepted by the parties
and the public, so too do factual findings provide more
substantial support for judgments when the evidence supporting them can be measured against generally accepted
standards. When parties and interested observers can weigh
the evidence for themselves and conclude that the factfinder
has drawn reasonable inferences and reached warranted
conclusions, public confidence in authoritative rulings will be
at its zenith. Considered on that dimension, scientific evidence
deserves to be regarded as especially useful in court: Science as
a discipline imposes strict limitations on what can count
as a scientific truth-claim; so long as those limitations are
respected, the standards that the scientific community imposes
for evaluating data and the inferences drawn therefrom will
also provide intersubjectively intelligible measures of the
validity and strength of the particular truth-claim at issue. Put
more simply, science provides accepted tests for whether and to
what extent opinions deserve to be respected as scientific
conclusions; and legal judgments that employ those tests thus
partake of the authority that the scientific method confers on
robust research results.
To start with science’s ground rules—what philosophers
of science call methodological naturalism, but those in the
lab just call the scientific method—doing science means
committing oneself to the search for natural explanations for
natural phenomena. As the National Academy of Sciences has
put it:

866

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

In science, explanations are restricted to those that can be inferred
from the confirmable data—the results obtained through
observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other
scientists. Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable
to scientific investigation. Explanations that cannot be based on
empirical evidence are not a part of science.5

Science thus differs from other disciplines not in its
areas of interest—which are almost infinitely varied, and
which overlap with matters addressed by philosophers,
historians, theologians, and scholars in many other fields—but
in its modes of analysis. Only observation and inference
confirmable using sense data are regarded as permissible forms
of scientific inquiry. If we can’t see, feel, hear, smell, or taste
something, we can’t study it using science (though there may
be many nonscientific ways to analyze it profitably) because
only if conclusions are based wholly on empirical observation
can others repeat, test, and potentially falsify the results. We
might hypothesize an unseen force—gravity, for example—to
explain the otherwise unexplainable—why the apple falls from
the tree. We cannot call gravity a scientific theory, however,
until we have ascertained that our hypothesis holds up under
rigorous empirical testing and retains its explanatory power in
a wide array of conditions. And if the hypothesis cannot be
tested and potentially falsified, it is not amenable to scientific
inquiry.
Methodological naturalism is a pragmatic rule, not a
deeper philosophical commitment to materialism. The reason
that science as a discipline limits itself to natural explanations
is that what is observable, repeatable, testable, and falsifiable
provides the basis for making useful predictions. If, for
example, we can explain drug-resistant illnesses in terms of
evolutionary theory—natural selection acting on populations of
bacteria undergoing random genetic mutations—we can predict
how new antibiotics or healthcare practices might minimize the
growth of drug-resistant strains.
In making the choice to seek causal explanations that
allow for prediction, we formally reject nonnatural
explanations—divine intervention, spirit forces, or anything
5
WORKING GROUP ON TEACHING EVOLUTION, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, TEACHING ABOUT EVOLUTION AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 27 (1998); see
also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES & INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SCIENCE,
EVOLUTION, AND CREATIONISM 10 (2008) (defining science as “[t]he use of evidence to
construct testable explanations and predictions of natural phenomena, as well as the
knowledge generated through this process”).
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else partaking of the supernatural—as standing outside
science’s ken. We do so not because those explanations are
necessarily wrong, but because, by definition, supernatural
actors or forces exist and function outside the laws of nature,
doing whatever they please, whenever they wish, and however
they choose. So the willingness to entertain the idea of
nonnatural causation as part of one’s scientific research
program would mean throwing in the towel on the possibility of
doing science at all: Because one can never prove or disprove
supernatural explanations—because, in short, “God did it”
explains everything and nothing—one can never reach
conclusions about when, where, how, or even whether a
nonnatural cause will next occur. Each nonnatural cause—each
act of divine intervention—is sui generis. So we can never
confirm or reject a supernatural explanation, even in principle;
a leap of faith is always required. And hence, unless
nonnatural causes are formally excluded, one can never have
the slightest confidence in any prediction; supernatural acts
can always break any causal chain. Rather than being the
product of natural selection acting on random genetic
mutations in bacteria, perhaps drug-resistant diseases might
be the work of some unseen, undiscoverable being or beings
who occasionally start epidemics in order to keep the human
population in check, or to test our faith with suffering (as the
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages viewed infectious diseases
now routinely cured with antibiotics), or to punish sinners (as
some fundamentalist-Christian leaders today explain the AIDS
virus and, for that matter, hurricane Katrina and September
11). Why bother attempting to develop new antibiotics or to
formulate better healthcare practices when, from our limited
point of view, there’s no rhyme or reason to how God, the devil,
the ghost in the machine, or a merry band of cosmic pranksters
will act next—unless, of course, we have had the grand plan
handed to us as revealed truth?6
6
I do not mean to suggest that pure reason, empirical observation, and
religious belief or other invocations of nonnatural causes are inherently irreconcilable.
They may or may not be in tension, depending on one’s theological commitments. But
while for many if not most people, all three cohere and are mutually reinforcing—a
philosophical and theological view with a distinguished Enlightenment pedigree but
roots extending much further back in Western intellectual and religious history—one
still must necessarily take a leap of faith from science’s empirical observations and
conclusions to the idea that a supernatural force is working behind the scenes.
As Catholic theologian John Haught explained in testifying for the
plaintiffs in the Kitzmiller intelligent-design case, science and faith need not be at
loggerheads because science has more modest aims than religion does: It restricts itself
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In formally excluding from scientific inquiry those sorts
of explanations for natural phenomena, while still
acknowledging, of course, that they might be true, and that
science might be inadequate to tell us everything about
everything, science as a discipline puts a premium on
continuing the search for causal explanations that can
potentially serve as the basis for prediction and responsive
action. If no natural explanations work, there will be time
enough at the end of the day to step outside the realm of
scientific inquiry and invoke nonnatural explanations. The
alternative—accepting at the outset that the causal mechanisms producing observable phenomena are unknown and
inherently unknowable—would be a recipe for stagnation,
encouraging would-be scientists to throw up their hands in
despair of ever adding to the store of human knowledge or
solving any practical problem.
IV.

SCIENTIFIC AUTHORITY AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS

The methodological restriction on the sorts of
explanations that can count as scientific turns out to have a
salutary effect for legal proceedings as well as for science itself:
Limiting research to what is repeatable, falsifiable, and
testable means drawing conclusions that are empirically
verifiable using sense data to which everyone has epistemic
access. If one maintains a commitment to methodological
naturalism (and therefore refuses, for purposes of conducting
research, to consider any explanations other than those that
are falsifiable through empirical observation and testing), then
what is left as the basis for permissible inferences is equally
to what Haught termed “how” questions (“How do systems function?”), whereas religion
transcends the material to ask “why” questions (“Why are we here?”). See Kitzmiller,
400 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
Methodological naturalism functions as a bar to scientific exploration of
the “why” questions, even though scientific discoveries very often have consequences
for how we think about those bigger metaphysical issues. So while research scientists
may choose to comment on what they view as the philosophical or theological
implications of their work, they do so not as scientists but as educated laity. Although
they may not always be punctilious about informing their audience when they are
doffing their lab coats to confront questions of faith and spirituality that they regard as
partially illuminated by discoveries made in their professional capacities, science as a
discipline requires them to draw a careful line between conclusions within the scope of
scientific inquiry and those outside it. For an example of appropriate rigor in
distinguishing between scientific findings and metaphysical views arising in part from
nonscientific interpretations of those findings, see KENNETH R. MILLER, FINDING
DARWIN’S GOD: A SCIENTIST’S SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND BETWEEN GOD AND
EVOLUTION (1999).
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intelligible to everyone, at least in principle: We all have
roughly the same capacity to observe, measure, and test, so we
each, independently, have the ability to assess the validity and
strength of any inferences drawn from the data. The upshot is
that science has at its core a strong form of intersubjective
validity: A conclusion based on evidence derived from research
properly employing the scientific method inspires confidence
because everyone can evaluate it using common and relatively
easily applied criteria (namely, those that a scientific discipline
sets for itself to test and potentially falsify hypotheses). And
hence, there is never any need to take it on faith that an
opinion or assertion is reliable.
Although science is enormously useful in its own right,
and has the potential to inspire great confidence in decisions
or courses of action grounded in it, I certainly do not mean to
suggest that all invocations of science are inherently trustworthy, or that scientific fraud never occurs. Nor are courtroom
misrepresentations (whether intentional or resulting from
lawyers’ or experts’ ignorance or lack of preparation) less
harmful when made by those claiming the mantle of scientific
authority than when made by anyone else. Quite the contrary.
If a legal system’s legitimacy turns on the ability of stakeholders and others to evaluate evidence independently and
satisfy themselves that judgments are fair, careful, and
warranted in light of the evidence, the operative legal rules,
and permissible forms of legal reasoning, then misrepresentations that play on judges’ and jurors’ lack of scientific acumen
will distort factfinding and cast a pall over judgments, leaving
parties and observers to worry that the legal system is
inadequate to resolve disputes. Obtaining acceptably reliable
judgments grounded in scientific-expert testimony thus turns
out to depend, after all, on ascertaining the amount of respect
that an expert witness’s truth-claims ought to receive. But
that calculus depends on the degree to which the evidence
demonstrably bears the indicia of genuine science, and thereby
takes advantage of the intersubjective validity that the
scientific method provides—whatever one may think of
science’s ability to reveal truth in a metaphysical sense.
In his classic experiments on obedience to authority,
psychologist Stanley Milgram showed how dressing an actor in
a lab coat and introducing him as a research scientist could
cause people from all walks of life, with all levels of education,
to set aside their own judgment and afford deference—indeed,
blind obedience—far beyond what reason, or even simple
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decency, should have permitted.7 Confronted with the apparent
authority and imprimatur of the scientific community,
Milgram’s test subjects would obey instructions to deliver
harmful electrical shocks to another person.8 Believing
that they were assisting in the conduct of an experiment,
rather than that they themselves were the subjects of study,
they would suspend compassion and all sense of moral
responsibility, delivering shock after shock, in what appeared
to be increasingly dangerous voltages, just because the fellow
in the lab coat said that the scientific enterprise required their
continuing participation.9
In the courtroom, this white-coat effect leads not to
blind obedience, but to blind acceptance, though the effect is
every bit as real—and in high-stakes cases, potentially every
bit as pernicious. Technospeak alone may be quite enough to
fool even well-educated nonscientists into thinking that there
must be merit to what a witness is saying, even if the
testimony is, in actuality, entirely vacuous. Judges and juries
may suspend their reason, judgment, and basic common sense,
accepting arrant nonsense as true just because the witness who
delivers it looks and sounds like a bona fide scientist.
Conversely, they may reject science of the highest caliber if the
witness presenting it does not wear the mantle of scientific
authority well: A genuine expert who tries too hard to speak
plainly, or who simply does not cut an impressive figure in the
witness box, may be unfairly dismissed as a hack or a fraud.
What could cast greater doubt on the reliability and integrity of
legal judgments than the realization that ordinarily skeptical
people, empowered to make decisions about others’ fates and
fortunes, may base their decisions on unreflective acceptance of
charlatanism supported by showmanship, ignoring solid
research backed by training and experience?
Thus, the problem of institutional competence resurfaces, albeit at a different level of abstraction: What matters is
not so much whether judges and juries can independently
evaluate the data put before them, but whether they can truly
grasp the nature of science itself in order to ascertain whether
a statement of opinion should receive the respect that
intersubjectively valid scientific findings do as foundations for

7
8
9

See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
See id. at 3-4, 16-19.
See id. at 3-4, 16-23.
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authoritative judgments. The worry, then, is that if factfinders
are not equipped to distinguish good chemistry or physics or
genetics from bad, how much more difficult must it be for them
to look beneath the particulars of slickly presented expert
opinions in order to determine not just which side boasts the
more convincing findings, but whether and to what extent each
proffered expert is engaging in the scientific enterprise in the
first place?
But limitations on judges’ and juries’ ability to parse
and weigh scientific evidence notwithstanding, my own view is
that the institutional-competence problem is not nearly so
hopeless as we often suppose—in part because it turns out that
courts are better at answering the philosophically rich
question, “Is it science?” than at resolving the more pedestrian
question, “Is it good science?”
One reason why is that the Daubert test10 offers a
readily administrable formula for ascertaining whether an
opinion counts as scientific, though not necessarily for
determining the strength of particular scientific inferences and
conclusions. Although courts applying the Daubert criteria
routinely speak in terms of distinguishing good science from
junk science (a term that encompasses both poor science and
pseudoscience), what they are really doing, and what, as I read
Daubert, the Supreme Court meant for them to be doing, is
distinguishing between science qua science (empirical inquiry
employing the scientific method), on the one hand, and
nonscience (inferences and conclusions not derived from
testable, repeatable, falsifiable observations), on the other.
Daubert adopts and employs the scientific community’s selfunderstanding about what science is, requiring the party
proffering the expert witness to demonstrate that the data and
opinions offered satisfy science’s ground rules.11 In the process,
the Daubert test also brings to light the specific features of the
evidence that the scientific community itself would use to
assess the validity, reliability, and explanatory power of any
purported findings;12 but those added benefits are in a sense
only incidental to the Daubert inquiry.
Although most commentators treat the Daubert test
as though it was designed to address those second-order

10
11
12

See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 590.
Id. at 590-95.
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questions, that conventional view is inconsistent with both the
test’s specific features and the analytical approach that the
Supreme Court took in formulating it. The Court did not, after
all, try to define “good science” or “good enough science”
according to some qualitative measure. It built the Daubert
standard on a definition of “scientific knowledge”—the
operative term in Federal Rule of Evidence 702—that the
Court drew not from background legal principles or established
court practices, but from the scientific community’s own
definition of science as methodological naturalism.13 Thus, the
Daubert factors are, as formally stated, far better suited to
discovering whether expert testimony is grounded in the
scientific method than to deciding how much explanatory
power an expert’s findings actually have. Whether an expert’s
procedures or conclusions can be and have been tested and
whether they have known or potential error rates are, for
example, straightforward tests for determining whether an
opinion is falsifiable—not whether it has been falsified. Had
the Supreme Court meant to focus on the strength of the
evidence rather than on its classification as scientific or
nonscientific, the Daubert test surely would have required
parties to show that their experts’ proffered findings have
withstood actual testing and that they provide substantial
explanatory power with demonstrably low error rates. That
testing is possible and that error rates can be calculated are
certainly prerequisites to assessing the strength of the evidence
the way that practitioners in the relevant scholarly field would;
but in making the Daubert inquiry turn on the threshold
question of testability rather than on the results of actual
testing, the Supreme Court effectively instructed the lower
13
Relying principally on an amicus brief filed by scientific organizations, the
Supreme Court breathed life into Rule 702’s language by explaining:

The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures
of science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective
belief or unsupported speculation. . . . Of course, it would be unreasonable to
conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be “known” to a
certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. . . . But, in order to
qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method.
Id. at 590 (“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe.
Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations
about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement.” (quoting Brief for
the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of
Sciences as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 7-8, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No.
92-102), 1993 WL 13006281)).
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courts to ask “Is it science?” and not “Is it good science?”
Similarly, publication in peer-reviewed journals and general
acceptance in the scientific community demonstrate that the
evidence is sound science that can be taken seriously;14 they do
not measure the strength of, or confidence in, any reported
effect. Insofar as either party goes ahead and provides test
results, error rates, and the like, that information will, of
course, be highly relevant to the admissibility determination
under Rule 702 (or else to judgments about the evidence’s
weight in the merits determination, if it is admitted). But those
assessments of explanatory power speak only to whether and to
what degree the evidence will be helpful to the trier of fact—a
distinct consideration under Rule 702—and not to whether the
evidence counts as scientific knowledge in the abstract.
Courts as institutions are, as it turns out, quite well
suited to conducting the “Is it science?” inquiry that Daubert
mandates. The weaknesses ascribed to their handling of
scientific evidence become relevant, if at all, only at the secondstage assessment—whether the evidence is sufficiently strong
to be useful to the factfinder if admitted—or in weighing the
evidence at trial. In part, courts do a decent job performing the
threshold inquiry because the standards that Daubert imposes
do not require understanding all the ins and outs of any
particular scientific claim. But beyond that, adversary court
proceedings allow for, and indeed encourage, litigants to get at
the heart of what science is—to educate the factfinder about
the scientific method—in order to show whether the evidence
being offered passes muster as science. Although litigants who
take the additional pains to show how the scientific community
would evaluate the strength of their experts’ findings may well
invite more refined analysis of the probative value of their
evidence, the fact that courts may often accept those invitations should not blind us to how much intersubjective validity
the threshold inquiry embodied in Daubert alone provides. In
all events, the basic determination that some opinion is
scientific is a prerequisite to any second-order tests for greater
intersubjective validity that a court may choose to employ.
To illustrate the point, let me draw on my experience
litigating the intelligent-design case—Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
14
See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON 107 (2007);
WORKING PARTY ON EQUIPPING THE PUBLIC WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF PEER REVIEW,
PEER REVIEW AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF NEW SCIENTIFIC IDEAS 2-3, 7-10 (2004),
available at http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/index.php/site/project/33.
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School District15—as the Kitzmiller trial and the decision that
came out of it bring into sharp relief the difference between the
“Is it science?” and “Is it good science?” inquiries. Kitzmiller
involved a battle of experts over whether intelligent design is
a scientific theory or a nonscientific, religious view—though
with a substantial measure of the good-versus-bad-science
debate thrown in.16 The Supreme Court had long since held
that the Establishment Clause prohibits teaching creationism
(a religious view) in public schools, even if that view is dressed
up to look like science.17 So one of the two central questions
in Kitzmiller was whether intelligent design is simply a
repackaging of creationism to look like a scientific claim.18 The
Dover school district tried to recast the controversy, however,
as an internecine dispute among scientists about whether
intelligent design is good or bad science, without worrying
overmuch about how anyone might think that supposed debate
would turn out. Indeed, the school district’s expert witnesses
themselves contended only that intelligent design is science in
its infancy, with one characterizing it as no better than “fringe
science.”19 As a litigation strategy, that approach was entirely
rational. The school district did not need to make any more
robust claims about intelligent design because while the
Establishment Clause forbids teaching religion in public
schools, it places no restriction on teaching science (no matter
how poor or misguided or flaky that science might be). So the
claim that intelligent design is science would, if true, have gone
a long way toward insulating the school district’s actions from
constitutional challenge.20

15

400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
See id. at 716-23, 735-46.
17
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (striking down a statute
requiring public schools to teach “creation science” if they teach evolution).
18
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12. The other issue central to the
case was whether the Dover school board had a religious objective when it added
intelligent design to the school district’s biology curriculum. Id. at 762-63. Both
questions mattered because, under the Establishment Clause, governmental action is
unconstitutional if either its primary purpose or its primary effect is to advance
religion. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 582-83 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971)).
19
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
20
It would not have done so absolutely, however, because a decision to teach
or to refrain from teaching even genuine science would violate the Establishment
Clause if the reason for the choice was school officials’ desire to tailor the science
curriculum “to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.” Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
16
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In a thorough, carefully reasoned opinion that has
earned praise from both the scientific and legal communities,
Judge John E. Jones III of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that intelligent
design does not obey science’s methodological ground rules, but
instead invokes divine causation: It explains the diversity of
life on earth by saying, in essence, that “God did it.”21 Hence,
intelligent design is not science, good or bad, mainstream or
fringe; it is, the court concluded, a religious view.
What Kitzmiller shows in spades is that the adversary
system and the rules of evidence serve incredibly well to allow
lawyers and expert witnesses to inform judges and juries about
what science is and how it works, so that the factfinders, in
turn, can make at least gross distinctions to screen out
nonscientific beliefs dressed up to look like science.22 As
Margaret Talbot explained in an account of the Kitzmiller trial
published in the New Yorker:
You sometimes hear it said that a courtroom is not a proper venue
for debating science. In this case, it proved to be an ideal forum. . . .
21

See, e.g., Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718-22.
To be sure, Judge Jones’s opinion in Kitzmiller did not just make gross
distinctions. Quite the contrary; I am told that Kitzmiller is now required reading
in many undergraduate- and graduate-level science courses, not just because of its
clear explanation of the basics of evolutionary biology, but also because of its precise
exposition of the nature of science itself.
Courts need not, however, speak in every case involving scientific-expert
testimony (or its pseudoscience counterpart) with the precision and detail that the
Kitzmiller court did. As argued above (see supra Part II), the degree to which courts
must explain and publicly justify their judgments turns, at least in part, on the
importance and the publicity of the case. The stakes in Kitzmiller were extraordinarily
high: Against a national movement to market intelligent-design creationism to public
schools, to state boards of education, and to legislatures, there stood eleven parents
who were not only vindicating their own right to decide what religious education their
children would receive, but also acting as proxies for concerned parents and defenders
of science everywhere. With so much on the line for so many, on both sides of the issue,
the court’s legitimacy to decide the case, and thereby to take a step toward quelling the
larger culture clash over science education and religious control, depended on Judge
Jones’s issuing an opinion that would provide an almost unprecedented level of public
justification for the ruling. See Katskee, supra note 4, at 158-61.
Those in the intelligent-design movement who have since chided Judge
Jones for saying too much understood perfectly well what was at stake; they simply
wished to avoid a definitive legal ruling that might undercut their ongoing attempts to
foment social controversy. See DAVID K. DEWOLF ET AL., TRAIPSING INTO EVOLUTION:
INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THE KITZMILLER VS. DOVER DECISION 7-57, 74-76, 79-92
(2006); Brief of Amici Curiae Biologists and Other Scientists in Support of Defendants,
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, at 6, available at http://www.discovery.org/
scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?command=download&id=558; (Revised) Brief of
Amicus Curiae, the Discovery Institute, Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (No. 04cv2688),
at 11-12, 20 n.30, available at http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDBdownload.php?command=download&id=646.
22
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The trial . . . allowed the lawyers to act as proxies for the rest of us,
and ask of scientists questions that we’d probably be too
embarrassed to ask ourselves. In a courtroom, you must lay an
intellectual foundation in order to earn a line of questioning—and so
the lawyers stripped matters neatly back to the first principles of
science.23

What Talbot found so compelling was that, far from misleading
the court about science, the parties’ presentations of expert
testimony in an adversary proceeding informed by the
principles in Daubert revealed the nature and core characteristics of science and scientific truth, thus allowing the
court (and everyone else) to assess whether the intelligentdesign movement could legitimately claim to be a scientific
enterprise.24
The fact that the legal proceedings worked so well to
expose intelligent design as a nonscientific, religious view
resting on belief in a supernatural creator is an especially
strong indicator of what courts and the adversary system can
accomplish. After all, the intelligent-design movement’s grand
strategic plan—its raison d’être—is to recast religious belief as
a simulacrum of science in the hope that judges will have
neither the skill nor the patience to look behind the façade.25 If
an adversary proceeding applying Daubert-type criteria could
prove so effective for stripping away that façade, built up over
23
Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the Dock: Intelligent Design Has Its Day in
Court, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66.
24
I should note that there were no Daubert hearings in Kitzmiller. The
court’s first opportunity to evaluate the reliability of the expert testimony came during
the six-week bench trial. But while neither party formally invoked Daubert, the
Daubert factors were the subtext of both sides’ expert cases because Daubert so effectively encapsulates the scientific community’s own understanding of what science is.
The school district did challenge the testimony of Barbara Forrest, a
philosopher and social historian who gave expert evidence for the plaintiff-parents
about the history and character of the intelligent-design movement. The school
district’s counsel sought, unsuccessfully, to discredit Dr. Forrest in order to try to
persuade the court to exclude her testimony about the movement’s inherently religious
aims and strategic plan. See Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to
Exclude the Testimony of Barbara Forrest, Ph.D., at 1, Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707
(No. 04-CV-2688), 2005 WL 3628818. But neither party made any attempt to exclude
any scientific—or putatively scientific—testimony.
25
As the Kitzmiller court found, and as many of us have explained elsewhere,
intelligent-design creationism is a repackaging of so-called creation science (itself a
repackaging of straightforward biblical creationism) to try to overcome the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Edwards, which prohibited the teaching of creation science in public
schools. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 722; BARBARA FORREST & PAUL R. GROSS,
CREATIONISM’S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2004); Matthew
J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest & Steven G. Gey, Is It Science Yet? Intelligent Design
Creationism and the Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 22-23 (2005); Katskee, supra
note 4, at 141-50.
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decades by a dedicated and well-funded cadre whose sole
objective was to deceive courts, legislatures, and the public into
accepting a nonscientific, religious belief as a scientific truthclaim (so that religion could then be slipped into public-school
curricula), surely it is not too much to expect courts in general
to uncover the far less sophisticated attempts to portray
nonscientific views as science that parties might cook up on the
fly and try to spoon-feed to a judge or jury in a single case.
There is also a simpler reason why the institutionalcompetence problem is not so serious as many suppose—one
that brings me back to my initial focus on courts’ institutional
objective. Even if courts may not infallibly identify the best
science when they are confronted with genuine disputes in
which both sides properly invoke the scientific method and
competing scientific truth-claims may appear to be in
something close to equipoise, that limitation does not preclude
courts’ fulfilling their social function. If, as argued above, the
point of a legal system is to resolve disagreements sufficiently
fairly and reliably to ensure that people continue resorting to
lawsuits rather than guns, even when they find themselves
embroiled in disputes serious enough to threaten social
stability, entirely correct decisions are not required in every
instance. Nor, of course, can they reasonably be expected:
Although ensuring perfect judgments all the time is an
admirable aspirational goal, we all recognize that perfection of
that sort is not possible for any human institution. Courts must
do a decent job screening out pseudoscience—that is to say,
nonscience posing as science—because it provides no basis for
the shared understanding that leads to trust in judgments. But
as long as courts achieve the far more modest aim to foster that
trust, the rulings that they issue, after weighing legitimate but
competing scientific claims and applying recognized modes of
legal reasoning, will have sufficient intersubjective validity to
make the judgments acceptable to most people most of the
time. In that case, courts will be able to fulfill their basic social
function to manage conflict, irrespective of whether they parse
scientific claims exactly right in any particular case—much less
whether they invariably and infallibly discover ultimate truth.

